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CHRISTIANITY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM:
A REPLY TO MEILAENDER
James A. Keller
In a recent paper, Gilbert Meilaender argues that Christian ethics must not be conse·
quentialist. Though Meilaender does indicate some problems which may exist with
certain consequentialist theories, those problems do not exclude all types of consequentialist theories from consideration as Christian ethical theories. A consequential ism
like R. M. Hare's offers virtually all the advantages Meilaender claims for his Christian deontological view. Moreover. Meilaender has overlooked certain advantages
of consequentialism and certain disadvantages of the sort of deontological theory he
espouses.

In a recent paper in this journal, Gilbert Meilaender argues that any Christian
ethics must not be consequentialist. I Though Meilaender does indicate some
problems which may exist with certain consequentialist theories, those problems
do not exclude all types of consequentialist theories from consideration as Christian ethical theories. A consequentialism like R. M. Hare's offers virtually all
the advantages Meilaender claims for his Christian deontological view. Moreover, Meilaender has overlooked certain advantages of consequentialism and
certain disadvantages of the sort of deontological theory he espouses. In this paper
I want to develop and defend these claims.
Meilaender's critique of consequentialism includes many of the standard objections: by placing on me an absolute obligation to maximize the good, it denies
me any free time to pursue my own desires and denies also any possibility of doing
more than duty requires; and by requiring me to adopt an impersonal standpoint
regarding the good, it makes impossible any special duties or special love to those
close to me (my family or friends) (400-407). But Meilaender does more than
just level these standard criticisms; he places them within a context which is of
special interest to readers of this journal. Consequentialism, he charges, involves
at root a failure of humans to trust in God, to keep their place as finite creatures
who are put in a particular place and given particular finite duties by a loving God
who is the one responsible for the outcome. To adopt consequentialism is therefore to abandon our proper place and to try to adopt a divine standpoint and divine
responsibility for the historical process; it is a failure of trust and the commission
of the sin of pride (passim; e.g., 399,402).
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Hare's Consequentialism
It may be that Meilaender' s criticism is fully justified against certain versions of
consequential ism; I would not want to try to defend all of them. But I want to show
that it does not apply against certain versions of consequentialism, in particular
against that of R. M. Hare, to which Meilaender makes several references. 2
Hare says that moral thinking can occur on two levels: the intuitive and the
critical. The intuitive level relies on general principles (moral rules). The rules
used by a person were adopted by that person at some time in the past, either
because they were taught or exemplified by some authority which the person
trusted or because the person determined that this would be a proper rule to
follow. The critical level does not rely on rules; rather it is the level used when
one is considering what rules to adopt or whether (or how) to modify a rule;
theoretically, it can also be used to determine what to do in a situation without
any reference to rules. 3 Of course, when one is criticizing or modifying rules,
one does so on the basis of consequentialist criteria: one tries to modify old rules
or to adopt new rules whose adoption will result in human beings acting so as
to achieve the greatest good possible by such limited beings. (We shall discuss
below the nature and implications of those limitations.)
Hare intends the distinction of the two levels to be completely general; any
moral agent might think on either or both of these levels, depending on his other
characteristics. As an expository aid, Hare invents the "archangel"-a person
who never needs to use the intuitive level, for the archangel knows instantaneously
everything about all the desires and feelings of everyone involved in a situation,
knows instantaneously all the consequences of every possible action, and always
effortlessly does what she knows will maximize the good.
But it would be wrong to take the archangel as a kind of ideal moral thinker
whom we humans should aspire to be like. We humans lack all three of the
characteristics which make it possible for an archangel to operate solely on the
critical level. Indeed we humans will have to operate most of the time on the
intuitive level-living by moral rules we have adopted in the past. Hare is not
as explicit about this as I would wish, but the overall tenor of his argument
points inescapably in this direction. In most situations, human beings lack the
knowledge to function as archangels, nor does life generally permit them time
to acquire this knowledge in each situation before they must act; and even if it
did, humans often lack the moral strength to do what such knowledge would
indicate is right (H 44-46). Therefore, for consequentialist reasons it is very
important that humans be well brought up, that they be furnished with moral
rules to which they have a deep intellectual, affective, and conative commitment,
and on which they habitually act in most situations. Thus Hare would agree with
Meilaender that most of the time humans should make moral decisions on the
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basis of moral rules which they have previously adopted.
But if such moral rules are to function for human beings in this way, there are
certain restrictions on them. They must not be too complicated for the average
human to learn and apply (H 34-35); they must not require a level of moral will or
dedication or self-sacrifice of which the average human is incapable (or to which
the average human may not reasonably aspire) (H 200-201).4 Given these restrictions on the moral rules, Hare would agree with Meilaender that the moral rules by
which human beings live must not require that they be working at every moment to
maximize the good (for no human has the knowledge or moral strength to do so);
therefore, the rules must permit free time and therefore also allow acts that exceed
the demands of duty (as specified by the rules). Hare would also agree that the
rules may allow or impose special duties to those close to us. 5
The foregoing is the framework of Hare's way of employing the act-consequentialismlrule-consequentialism distinction. This distinction, which has been the subject of much discussion, is strangely ignored by Meilaender, who writes as though
the only sort of consequentialism were act-consequentialism. Many of his criticisms are invalid against most types of rule-consequentialism, as readers familiar
with the literature will recognize from my discussion of Hare's consequentialism.
Admittedly, the distinction raises difficulties of its own, particularly those concerning the justification of making moral decisions on the basis of following rules
rather than on the basis of calculating the consequences of each act. But I think
Hare's approach satisfactorily resolves those problems, for it bases the justification
firmly on consequentialist grounds. He argues that if humans typically make moral
decisions on the basis of moral rules which they have previously adopted, this
strategy will result in their acting more nearly in accord with what an archangel
would want them to do than any alternative strategy (e.g., trying to be archangels
and decide what to do in each situation on the basis of a consequentialist calculation
regarding the actions open to them in that situation.)
But even if Hare can in this way defuse Meilaender's standard criticisms of consequentialism, what of Meilaender's more original charges that consequentialism
"asks us to think of love apart from trust," that it requires human beings to assume
a God-like vantage point and responsibility for the success of the good, and thus
that it requires them to commit the sin of pride? Hare does not speak to these points,
so the following comments reflect my own attempt to apply an outlook like Hare's
within an explicitly Christian context. First, we should recall Hare's insistence
that moral rules are general principles meant to apply to human beings as they are
in the situation ofthis actual world. If that situation includes the presence and activity of a loving God who can be counted on to do certain things, then that will affect
what rules it is appropriate for human beings to adopt. I mean this not in the sense
that if such a God commands something, it should be done, but in the sense that if
such a God does certain things, then human beings do not have to do them (unless
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they are things which God does through human beings).
Second, Meilaender's criticism seems to be based on a confusion (or equation)
of the criterion of a right action with the motive for doing the action. Suppose that
I do (what an archangel would agree) is right, but I do it because it accords with a
moral rule which I have learned; even if I have never thought about what makes the
rule right, my action would still be right, and I might well merit moral praise for
doing it. Human beings are human beings, not archangels, and it is and it is more
more important that they do the right than that they understand the different levels
of moral thinking or what ultimately justifies an action or a moral rule. 6 Indeed,
when we act in accordance with a moral rule, most of us most of the time do
not think about what justifies the rule. That we do not think about what justifies
the rule does not, however, indicate that we are deontologists (as Meilaender
perhaps assumes). For deontologists as well as consequentialists have a theory
about what justifies moral rules, and we are not deontologists unless we accept
a theory of that sort.
The failure to distinguish between the criterion and the motive for a right
action vitiates some of Meilaender's other criticisms of consequentialism. For
example, at one point Meilaender acknowledges that there are consequentialist
defenses for reading a book, taking a walk, and in general pursuing one's own
desires. But he says that even if such justification is possible, "a task taken up
for that reason can never be the same. 'The unbought grace of life' is missed
when obligation replaces freedom" (405). I quoted his reply because I find it
cryptic. But insofar as I understand it, I take him to be implying that a consequentialist must justify each of these activities by showing that it promotes the good.
But why could not a consequentialist say that having a rule which permits people
some free time to use as they please promotes the good better than not having
such a rule? Then there would be no need to show that what he was doing in
his free time promoted the general good. In these free-time activities, he does
what he does because he enjoys doing it. If he is worried about the justification
for his having free time, he can (perhaps) provide it. But that justification for
having free time is not the reason why he spends it as he does. (Compare this
account with one Meilaender might give on behalf of the Christian deontologist.
If asked why she is taking a walk, she might reply that it pleases her. If asked
why she is not busy doing loving things for her neighbor, she might reply that
God has given her the time. But that does not mean that she is spending the
time as she is because God has given it to her; rather, she is spending it as she
is because she desires to spend it in this way. The permission of God is not the
direct reason why she is spending the time as she is. It plays a similar role to
the consequentialist justification for allotting free time to individuals.)
Similarly, Meilaender claims that consequentialism inevitably pressures a
person into a calculating, deliberative mode and that this mode would preclude

202

Faith and Philosophy

the enjoyment of many pleasures which can be experienced only if we do not
aim at them (405). And he suggests "that most of us, most of the time, ought
not try to live each moment as if we were consequentialists" (406), an idea he
attributes to Sidgwick. These conclusions about the mode of our lives and about
how we should live each moment are ones which Hare would, I think, embrace.
But once again, they lose their force against consequentialism if it is seen as
providing the criterion for a right action, but not necessarily the motive.
Perhaps underlying the failure to distinguish the criterion and the motive of
right action is a failure to consider the different ways in which the consequentialist
criterion of right actions might be used in evaluating moral rules. There are at
least two important issues involved in this matter. One is whether it is to be a
negative criterion or a positive one-i.e., should a moral rule be accepted unless
it can be shown not to contribute to the maximization of the good or should it
be accepted only if it can be shown to contribute to that good? The other is
whether it need be applied prospectively or only under challenge-i.e., must
the rule be justified (in one of the foregoing senses) before the person can be
morally correct in living by it, or is it sufficient that it can be shown to be
justified if it is challenged? I am not aware of any place where Hare speaks to
either of these points, so I can only suggest what I think is consistent with his
overall approach. I am quite sure that he would not insist on prospective justification of all moral rules; he is too aware of limitations on human ability and
time to impose such a requirement. But it would seem proper to require it before
a new rule is adopted. I am less sure about what Hare would say on the other
issue, but I suspect that he would require a positive justification only for rules
which impose positive duties but only a negative justification for rules which
impose negative duties. For positive duties limit our ability to pursue our desires
more than negative duties do; and since in general the good tends to be achieved
more fully when people can pursue their desires, a stronger kind of justification
would be required for rules which impose positive duties.
One implication of the foregoing distinctions is that the consequentialist need
not take it upon herself to provide a justification for every moral rule by which
she lives, nor need she even abandon every such rule unless she can show it to
be positively justified. She might well accept most of the rules by which she
lives without qualm or question, believing that they have emerged through human
interaction in such a way as generally to promote the good. If she is a Christian
consequentialist, she may even ascribe this propitious outcome to the providence
of God. But though she may believe that the moral rules governing her society
generally promote human good, she will not be unwilling or unable to evaluate
one or more of them critically, should the need arise. (The Christian consequentialist will remember that here in via the world suffers from the effects of human
sinfulness as well as benefitting from the providence of God.)
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The foregoing also enables us to see why Meilaender is wrong in claiming
that consequentialism results in a division between those who can "rise to the
impersonal standpoint of an objective calculator of the general wellbeing" and
those who cannot, with the former manipulating the latter (406). To see why
this need not happen, recall that most of us, including even the best human
calculators, most of the time will (and should!) act in accordance with moral
rules which we have accepted and whose justification we usually do not think
about. And when these rules conflict, any of us (not just an elite) may engage
in critical thinking about which rule to follow. When new information or a new
situation arises which seems to call into question some accepted rule, society
will understandably want any help available to determine whether some new
rule would better promote the general good. If some are particularly good calculators (i.e., skilled in the relevant types of thinking), society will especially
welcome their help. Are such people therefore superior to those who are not as
skilled? Perhaps they are, just as those who can understand calculus are superior
to those who cannot. But their "superiority" is not a moral superiority and is far
less important than the superiority of those whose actions promote the general
good over those whose actions do not; that is the superiority which truly matters
to the consequentialist. Thus a consequentialist who is superior in the relevant
sort of thinking has no basis for believing himself part of an elite group.7 Nor
is there any reason to think that the better calculators will manipulate others.
They can be quite open about their reasons for advocating the moral rules which
they do, and their proposals might be adopted because people believe that they
are a way to improve society.

The Advantages of Consequentialism
Thus far most of my argument has merely tended to show that the advantages
which Meilaender claims for his type of Christian deontological view can be
matched by Hare's type of consequentialism. The issue between them is nut
whether people should generally live by moral rules, but how those rules should
be justified. But Hare's consequential ism is not simply another way to achieve
those advantages, for there are at least four other advantages to Hare's view
which are not matched by Meilaender's.
First, Hare's view gives us a way of deciding what to do when moral rules
conflict and a way of evaluating moral rules when new situations cause us to
wonder whether some revision is needed. That moral rules will sometimes conflict
is virtually inevitable. A moral rule applies when a situation has certain features;
a different rule will apply when it has other features. But sometimes situations
will occur which have both sets of features and when the moral rules will direct
us to take inconsistent actions. Every moral system needs some way to deal with
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such conflicts; Meilaender does not indicate what method he would use to deal
with them. 8 Moreover, as new situations arise, old rules may need to be revised,
and new rules may need to be formulated; sometimes this can be done by making
a new application of some existing, more basic moral rule. But is there any
guarantee that this will always be possible? And if not, how shall we go about
changing old rules and formulating new ones? Hare's position at least gives us
a method. Admittedly, we may sometimes lack the knowledge or the time to
apply the method, but at least sometimes it will give us an answer. 9
A second advantage of Hare's approach is that it makes possible a fruitful
dialogue between those who live by different moral rules. When talking with
those who live by different rules, Meilaender will have to appeal to his knowledge
of God's commands; and if his opponents do likewise (or appeal to their intuitions), there seems little possibility for any fruitful exchange between them about
which rules to live by. Of course, if my rules applied only to me and your rules
applied only to you, then there would be no need for dialogue; each person could
live by his own moral rules. But society cannot function this way. Some rules
must apply to everyone; on only a certain range of matters can society permit
each person to live by his or her own rules. But how shall we determine which
rules will apply to everyone? By each person's appealing to his or her own
perception of God's commands (or intuitions) or by appeal to a shared criterion?
A third advantage is related to the second one. Not only does Hare's consequentialism offer a basis for fruitful dialogue between people who adhere to different
rules, it positively encourages an adherent to engage in dialogue with other people.
For if the good which I am seeking to foster is a good which depends on others'
desires and the quality of others' experiences, how can I intelligentl y determine
which rules will foster that good except by coming to know other people? Thus,
the very process of resolving conflicts among rules and of determining whether
some rules need revision will force me to get to know my fellow human beings.
Meilaender's approach does not require this; it does not even seem to promote it.
A fourth advantage is one to which Meilaender alludes (400, 402): there appears
to be an important similarity between the principle of promoting the general good
and the command to love one's neighbor. Meilaender regards this appearance as
deceptive, but his reasons are simply those criticisms of consequentialism which
we have already considered and rejected. So let us reexamine this apparent similarity. Suppose that we are Christians and that we regard the command to love our
neighbor as the chief commandment governing our relations to others. Suppose
too that we come to doubt whether one of the moral rules by which we are living
really does enhance our ability to treat others in a loving way. Shall we simply
suppress our doubts and rely on tradition? Or shall we try to determine whether the
rule does enhance our ability to love? If we do the latter, how shall we determine
whether or not it does? One way would be to see whether following the rule seems
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likely to promote more good for human beings than following any alternative we
can think of. This would be the Christian consequentialist's way; I find it very
plausible. What alternative would Meilaender propose?
There is a related point growing out of the command to love our neighbor. To
obey this command, we must have a more specific idea of what it requires. And
surely among those requirements are meeting the needs, and being responsive to
the desires, of others. This sounds like a modest consequentialism, even if it is for
the sake of the love command. Meilaender might reply that we are not responsible
for the success of our efforts to do loving things for our neighbor. I would agree
(provided this is not made an excuse for laziness or half-heartedness), but the
precise form our efforts should take is nevertheless determined (at least in part)
by consequentialist considerations.
Finally, I wish to say a word about what I am tempted to term the homiletic
aspects of Meilaender's paper. He suggests not only that consequentialists are
wrong, but that they are guilty of a lack of trust in God and of pride in their own role
in the scheme of things; moreover, he adds, "when the Christian virtues of trust,
love, and hope mutually interpenetrate our character, we may recognize in consequentialist moral theory the voice of the serpent" (405). I am uncertain how
seriously he intends these comments to be taken. All of them are supported by
other things he says in the article. But it leaves us who disagree with him in a rather
uncomfortable position: not only are we wrong, but our position involves us in
serious moral lapses as well. How can one reply to such a charge without compounding one's fault? Let me attempt to do so in this way. Meilaendermay be right
on these charges, just as he may be right on the non-moral faults of consequentialism. I do not think he is, but I am far from infallible and he may be right. And
even if these moral faults are not inevitable accompaniments of being a consequentialist, they may well be faults to which consequentialism predisposes its adherents.
But I think it is also true that deontologists may be similarly predisposed to certain
other sins. One is mentioned by Meilaender himself: he identifies as the sin of sloth
the refusal to exercise one's limited freedom to transcend one's own perspective
and to try to appreciate the perspective of others in order to be fair to them (399).
But a related pair he omits: the sins of pride and self-righteousness based on one's
conviction that one knows God's will. Warfare among various Christian groups
and religious persecution of minorities are just a few of the worst examples of
actions based on these sins. I do not suggest that these sins are the inescapable
result of holding a Christian deontological position; I claim only that it provides a
more fertile ground for them than does Christian consequentialism, just as the
latter provides a more fertile ground than the former for other sins.
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NOTES

I. "Eritis Sicut Deus: Moral Theory and the Sin of Pride," Faith and Philosophy, III, 4 (October
1986), 397-415. Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to this article.
2. My account of Hare's view will be based on his Moral Thinking, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981). Page references to this work will be identified in the text as H followed by the page
number(s).
3. I say "theoretically" because, as we shall see, the requirements for doing this are almost such
as to preclude a human being from doing it. Only rarely, if ever, could one meet them. I think that
humans should use the critical level almost exclusively for evaluating moral rules or for resolving
conflicts among them.
4. This somewhat oversimplifies Hare's position. He recognizes that people differ in their capacities.
Those who have the capacity to be saints should strive to be. But we should not require this of
everyone. Thus, he will countenance some moral rules of differing stringency for different people
(H 20\); adopting the more stringent rules would typically be the result of one's own decision, either
directly or by one's joining a particular group which adhered to those more stringent rules (e.g., a
monastic community). But he also says that some rules apply to everyone (H 200). Those rules that
apply to everyone presumably must not exceed the capacity of most people.
5. At one point Meilaender characterizes this sort of defense of consequential ism as a "grudging
acquiescence to our finite nature" (406). Perhaps it would be for some consequentialists, but it is
not for Hare---or for me. Moral rules must be appropriate to the beings to whom they apply. We
are concerned with moral rules for human beings. We should begrudge the effects which human
limitations have on the rules only if we begrudge those very limitations which make us human. Why
should it be thought necessary that all consequentialists do this? Some may have, but so may some
Christian deontologists.
6. In the Preface to his book Hare writes "that the quality of mutual love and affection between
people, without which our life would have few joys, cannot be had without the right dispositions;
and ... these dispositions, therefore, are the condition of both happiness and morality" (H vii).
7. The dangers of creating an elite group who (justifiably or not) claim to be better at knowing
what is good and right are not peculiar to consequentialist ethics. In any ethical system some will
be better than others at figuring out what it requires, whether that be through discerning the will of
God, intuiting our duty, etc. The problem of elitism is best dealt with by denying that superiority
in this ability constitutes moral superiority.
8. The closest he comes is his acknowledgment of the need to recognize that moral rules are
complex and that we must employ exception-clauses in the moral mles we adopt (409), but he gives
no hint how we are to determine which exception-clauses are correct. (He also has a longer discussion
of rare situations which he terms "supreme emergencies" (409); but what he says about these situations
sheds no light on the more ordinary situations with which I am concerned.)
9. When we lack the time or knowledge to engage in critical thinking, Hare's consistent recommendation is that we follow our current moral rules.

